There are several kinds of linear typed calculus in the literature, some with their associated notion of categorical model. Our aim in this paper is to systematise the relationship between three of these linear typed calculi and their models. We point out that mere soundness and completeness of a linear typed calculus with respect to a class of categorical models are not sufficient to identify the most appropriate class uniquely. We recommend instead to use the notion of internal language when relating a typed calculus to a class of models. After clarifying the internal languages of the categories of models in the literature we relate these models via reflections and coreflections.
Introduction
Over the last decade, the proof theory of intuitionistic linear logic and its categorical models have been studied by many researchers. However, the precise relationship between the different notions of model (and their status as models for different calculi) have not been fully worked out, and those results which have been proved are scattered throughout the literature. This paper attempts to rectify this situation by a careful re-examination and comparison of three of these different logics/calculi and their corresponding notions of categorical model. We consider the following typed calculi: Intuitionistic Linear Logic (called ILL [8] ), which is the first linear typed calculus for Girard and Lafont's sequent style formulation of Intuitionistic Linear Logic [14, 20] , Linear-non-Linear Logic (called LNL [5] ) whose models are a considerable simplification of the models of ILL, and Dual Intuitionistic and Linear Logic (called DILL [2] ) which fits better the implementational issues that we addressed elsewhere [28] . Of the sound and complete models given in the literature for these typed calculi we consider the following: linear categories for ILL ( [7, 9] ) and symmetric monoidal adjunctions, of slightly different kinds, for DILL and LNL (see [2] , [5] ).
Our leading idea is to relate typed calculi and their categorical models via the notion of internal language. Soundness and completeness theorems are not generally sufficient to identify the most appropriate class of categorical models for a typed calculus, unless the typed calculus provides an internal language of the models considered. Hence, we propose that a class of sound and complete models of a typed calculus should be called "the categorical semantics" of such a calculus if these models have theories of the given calculus as their internal language.
Our main example of why this more restrictive criterion needs to be used is provided by the typed calculus ILL. It is essentially equivalent to DILL and is sound and complete for both linear categories ( [7, 9] ) and for a certain class of symmetric monoidal adjunctions [2] . In the literature [5, 26] it is said that these two notions of categorical model for ILL are equivalent. But, after organising each class of models into categories, we show that the two categories of complete models (with morphisms preserving their structure up to isomorphisms) are linked by a reflection and not by a categorical equivalence. Moreover, we prove that only linear categories have ILL-theories as their internal language, while a fragment of LNL provides an internal language for the symmetric monoidal adjunctions which are sound and complete for ILL [2] .
This means that to establish a precise notion of equivalence between models, it is essential to consider also model morphisms. As notion of model morphism we take that of a functor preserving the model structure up to isomorphisms, or strictly. Strict preservation corresponds to translation between the internal languages of the models considered. The reason we also consider categories of models with functors preserving structure up to isomorphisms is to be able to relate these categories via reflections or coreflections.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the chosen linear typed calculi in appropriate detail. In Section 3 we organise all the models of ILL, DILL and LNL into categories and we check whether they satisfy the internal language criterion. Then, we relate the categories of models considered via reflections or coreflections. In particular, after relating linear categories with symmetric monoidal adjunction models via a reflection, we prove that the category of models of DILL with additive conjunction is coreflective in the category of models of LNL with additive conjunction in the linear part.
The systematization given here seems necessary if one intends to extend the work on these calculi to higher order ones, see for example [25] . This systematization makes clear which kind of model should be generalised and why.
Linear Typed Calculi
Intuitionistic Linear Logic, introduced by Girard and Lafont [14, 20] , has been investigated for its potential applications to functional programming. Several linear typed calculi, which could have been called "the correct" typed linear λ-calculus, have been proposed for these applications.
All these typed calculi have the (non-controversial) !-free fragment of intuitionistic linear logic, called rudimentary linear logic or RLL, in common. To add the connective ! we recall three alternative versions of linear λ-calculus. The linear λ-calculus of Bierman et al. [8] ILL, the linear-non-linear λ-calculus of Benton LNL [5] and finally Barber and Plotkin's Dual Intuitionistic and Linear λ-calculus DILL [2, 1] . There are other typed calculi for this fragment, but we concentrate on the ones with a given categorical model as the aim of this paper is to relate such calculi via their categorical semantics by using the criterion of connecting calculi and models via internal language theorems.
To this end we define the notion of theory and translations for each linear typed calculus and we organise them into a category, the category of theories of the considered calculus.
We start to define all these notions in general for a typed system and then we specialise them for each of the typed calculi.
General presentation of typed calculi
In this section we describe various linear typed calculi that provide proof-term annotation systems for fragments of propositional intuitionistic linear logic. Hence they deal with simple types only. A typed system with simple types is described by means of four kinds of judgements
where the first is a judgement saying that something is of sort type in the empty context, (i.e. we consider simple types only), the second that two simple types are equal, the third that a term M in context Σ is of a type A, the forth that two terms are equal. In this paper we consider calculi where Σ is either a simple context or a double context, i.e. it is formed by two kinds of contexts Γ | ∆, where Γ is the intuitionistic context and ∆ the linear one. For simplicity, in this general presentation we assume that Σ is a simple context and that contexts are lists, considered up to permutation and without repetitions, formed according to the following rules -∅ is a context; -if Σ is a context and A : type is derivable then Σ, x : A is a context.
To state that the type equality is an equivalence relation the typed system has the rules
and similarly for term equality:
The typed system has some type constructors: if F is an n-ary type constructor, then the system has the rule A 1 : type · · · A n : type
To say that any such type constructor F preserves type equality, the system has the rule
Analogously, the typed system has some term constructors f for building new terms from other terms according to
which also preserves term equality:
1 As usual, we identify terms which are equal up to the renaming of bound variables. For a precise treatment of this so-called α-conversion see for example [3] .
The system has also identity axioms; in the linear case with simple context there is just one:
x : A x : A Finally, the system has specific term equality axioms including β-equalities, η-equalities and also commuting conversions.
Usual presentations of typed systems with simple (non-dependent) types usually ignore equality of types as judgements since without extra equations the equality between types is simply syntactic identity. But we do consider equality of types because, when we come to consider theories, we allow additional equations between types 2 . Ordinary presentations of type systems usually present only the specific equalities of the term constructors, namely β-equalities, η-equalities and commuting conversions, by considering the other equations as implicit (see for example [27] ).
Now, we give a definition of a theory based on a typed calculus.
Definition 1. Given a typed calculus C, a typed system T is a C-theory if it is an extension of C with proper T -axioms, namely with new ground type symbols A and corresponding new judgements A type, new type equality judgements A = B, provided that A and B are types, new term symbols M together with new term judgements Σ M : A provided that Σ is a context and A a type symbol, and new equality judgements Σ M = N : A provided that Σ M : A and Σ N : A are derivable judgements.
In other words, a C-theory is an extension of C with new ground types, new term constants and new equalities between types and between terms. Hence, new inference rules of term constructors are not admitted. Now, we define the notion of C-translation.
Definition 2. Given a typed calculus C, a C-translation L between type theories T and T is a function from types and terms derivable in T -i.e. from type symbols A such that A : type is derivable in T and from terms M such that there exists a judgement Σ M : A derivable in T -to type and term of T by preserving type and term judgements, that is a type A for which A : type is derivable in T is mapped to a type L(A) such that
. . , x n : A n , and such that variables are sent to variables, i.e.
Moreover, we also require that L preserves C-type constructors, i.e. for any type constructor F of C and types
and that L preserves C-term constructors, i.e. for any term constructor f of C and terms
Finally, we require that L preserves the type equality judgements of T , i.e. for any judgement
is derivable in in T , and that L preserves the term equality judgements of T , i.e. for any
is derivable in T .
Remark 3. Note that we can extend the definition of C-translation L to all judgements of T by putting
Moreover, note that a C-translation is determined by its definition on the new types and terms added to the base calculus C.
For any typed calculus C, we introduce the category of C-theories and C-translations. Composition of two C-translations is simply composition of functions which is again a C-translation: Definition 4. For any typed calculus C, we call Th(C) the category having C-theories as objects and C-translations as morphisms.
In the following, when describing a linear typed system, we just mention the specific type constructors, typed term constructors and specific term equalities.
Rudimentary Linear Logic RLL
We describe the modality-free (or exponential-free in Girard's terminology) fragment of intuitionistic linear logic, i.e. we consider only tensor products, their unit and linear function spaces. A context ∆ used in a judgement consists of a list of variable declarations of the form a : A up to permutation and without repetitions according to the rules in subsection 2.1.
The RLL type constructor rules are the following: The RLL typed term constructor rules are given by:
Each RLL type constructor gives rise to both β (on the left) and η (on the right) equality rules as follows:
Note that our presentation of the equational system, using generalised η rules [12] , differs from the standard one (e.g. [9] ). The standard system has two η rules, namely let M be x⊗y in x⊗y = M and let M be • in • = M plus commuting conversions instead of the generalised η rules above 3 .
Definition 5. An RLL-theory is a calculus obtained by extending RLL with new ground types and corresponding type judgements, new type equality judgements, new term symbols and corresponding term judgements, and new term equality judgements as in Definition 1.
Definition 6. Given two RLL-theories T 1 and T 2 , an RLL-translation L is a translation from types and terms of T 1 to types and terms of T 2 preserving type and term judgements in the sense of Definition 2, preserving RLL type constructors, i.e
preserving RLL term constructors, i.e
and preserving the type and term equality judgements of T 1 .
Definition 7. The category Th(RLL) has RLL-theories as objects and RLL-translations as morphisms.
Intuitionistic Linear typed calculus ILL
The typed calculus ILL was originally presented by Benton, Bierman, de Paiva and Hyland in [8] . Like for RLL, in ILL a context ∆ used in the judgements consists of a list of variable declarations of the form a : A up to permutation and without repetitions. The ILL type constructor rules are those of RLL plus a rule for the modality type constructor !A:
A : type !A : type The ILL typed term constructor rules include those of RLL with the addition of the following rules:
!B This calculus has explicit rules (and terms) for copying and discarding assumptions, following [23] . It also has explicit substitutions in the "promotion" rule, to cope with the lack of substitutivity in previous systems. Since the number of equations is lengthy we refer the reader to Bierman's thesis [9] or [2, 1] . Definition 8. An ILL-theory is a calculus obtained by extending ILL with new ground types and corresponding type judgements, new type equality judgements, new term symbols and corresponding term judgements, and new term equality judgements as in Definition 1.
Definition 9.
Given two ILL-theories T 1 and T 2 , an ILL-translation L is a translation from types and terms of T 1 to types and terms of T 2 preserving type and term judgements in the sense of Definition 2, preserving ILL type constructors, i.e
and preserving ILL typed term constructors, i.e
Definition 10. The category Th(ILL) has ILL-theories as objects and ILL-translations as morphisms.
Linear-non-Linear typed calculus LNL
Benton's typed calculus LNL [5, 6] was obtained from its corresponding notion of categorical model, a sensible category theoretical generalisation of the notion of a model for ILL. It attaches equal prominence to both linear and intuitionistic logic, instead of giving linear logic the status of a basis. Hence, instead of defining weakening and contraction via special linear terms (like "copy M as a, b in N "), the typed calculus is split into a linear part and an intuitionistic part. The intuitionistic part is the simply typed λ-calculus with products. The type constructor !, which regulates when weakening and contraction are applicable, is replaced by an appropriate relation between the linear and the intuitionistic parts of the typed calculus. This special relation between the intuitionistic and the linear parts of the typed calculus is given by two type constructors F and G which map the intuitionistic typed calculus into the linear one and vice versa, and terms which describe how these type constructors interact.
Thus, LNL has type and term judgements and corresponding type equality and term equality judgements regarding the intuitionistic part of the form
and the corresponding type and term judgements with their equalities regarding the linear part of the form
where Γ is the intuitionistic (or non-linear) context and ∆ the linear one.
To make the distinction between these parts more visible, we write σ, τ, . . . for intuitionistic types, Γ, Γ for intuitionistic contexts, x, y, . . . for intuitionistic variables and t, s, . . . for intuitionistic terms. We write A, B, . . . for linear types, ∆, ∆ for linear contexts, a, b, . . . for linear variables and M, N, . . . for linear terms.
Hence, a (non-linear) context Γ consists of a list of variable declarations of the form x : σ up to permutation and without repetitions according to the rules in subsection 2.1, whereas a linear context ∆ consists of a list of variable declarations of the form a : A up to permutation and without repetitions according to the rules in subsection 2.1.
The LNL type constructor rules are:
The LNL typed term constructor rules are:
The β and η equations for intuitionistic terms, (defined using the judgement I ) are those for the simply typed lambda calculus (see for example [15] ) with connectives 1, × and →.
The β and η equations for the linear terms (defined using the judgement L ) are the ones for RLL plus the following β (on the left) and η (on the right) equality rules:
The generalised η rule for F is equivalent to the standard η rule (let M be F (x) in F (x) = M ) plus commuting conversions [5] . The typed calculus LNL presented here differs from Benton's original one only in that we add the η rules necessary to get a completeness theorem with respect to the models considered by Benton [5] . In the following we call LNL the calculus with η rules. 
A are derivable judgements, and new intuitionistic equality judgements Γ I t = s : σ, for derivable judgements Γ I t : σ and Γ I s : σ.
Definition 12. Given two LNL-theories T 1 and T 2 , an LNL-translation L is a translation from types and terms of T 1 to types and terms of T 2 preserving type and term judgements in the sense of Definition 2, i.e. sending an intuitionistic type σ for which I σ : type is derivable in
and preserving LNL type constructors, i.e
and preserving LNL typed term constructors, i.e.
Definition 13. The category Th(LNL) has LNL-theories as objects and LNL-translations as morphisms.
We call LNL the calculus LNL where we omit the intuitionistic implication from the intuitionistic (or non-linear) part of LNL. We define the category Th( LNL) of LNL-theories and LNL-translations accordingly.
Dual Intuitionistic and Linear Logic DILL
The typed calculus DILL was first considered by Plotkin and his student Barber [2, 1] 
The β and η equations for DILL are the ones for RLL plus the following β (on the left) and generalised η (on the right) rules:
Some of the advantages of DILL are:
1. there is no need for verbose syntax to deal with contraction and weakening as in ILL; these are handled implicitly as in intuitionistic logic;
2. the easy formulation of the rule of promotion (which caused all the trouble before in ILL). Definition 15. Given two DILL-theories T 1 and T 2 , a DILL-translation L is a translation from types and terms of T 1 to types and terms of T 2 preserving type and term judgements in the sense of Definition 2, i.e. sending a type A for which A : type is derivable in T 1 to a type L(A) such that L(A) : type is derivable in T 2 and sending a typed term
and preserves DILL type constructors, i.e.
and DILL typed term constructors, i.e.
and that preserves the type and term equality judgements of T 1 .
Definition 16. The category Th(DILL) has DILL-theories as objects and DILL-translations as morphisms.
Adding additive conjunction
It is well known that we can add additive conjunction & (read as "with") and its unit 1 to DILL so that we obtain & DILL.
The type constructor rules of & DILL for these types are:
1 : type A : type B : type A&B : type and the corresponding term constructor rules are:
We need to add the corresponding β and η rules typical of product types (see for example [15] ). Similarly, the rules above, suitably adapted, can be added to ILL, LNL and LNL to get
Relating ILL and DILL
We start by recalling that all the three typed calculi prove exactly the same purely linear theorems, i.e. they cannot be distinguished in terms of provability of purely linear theorems only. But our interest here is to compare them from the point of view of proofs. In this subsection we state precisely the relation between ILL and DILL. We say that two different type calculi are equivalent if there are translations sending wellformed types to well-formed types and well-typed terms to well-typed terms such that to preserve type and term equality judgements and such that when composed give you the identity, in both directions.
Theorem 17 (Barber) . ILL is equivalent to the fragment of DILL with only judgements of the form | ∆ M : A. In the same way & ILL is equivalent to the fragment of & DILL with only judgements of the form | ∆ M : A.
The proof of this can be found in Barber's thesis [1] , where he provides translations from DILL to ILL and conversely satisfying the above property. Note that this theorem says that DILL and ILL are essentially equivalent, since in DILL every judgement of the form Γ | ∆ M : A corresponds bijectively to a judgement |!Γ,
The concept of the category of theories helps us to improve the understanding of the relationship between ILL and DILL. Indeed, thanks to Theorem 17 we can prove that the category of DILL-theories is equivalent to that of ILL-theories. Proof. The proof is based on Theorem 17 whose corresponding translations are φ DILL : DILL → ILL and ψ ILL : ILL → DILL as defined in [1] . Note that such translations are identities on the types.
To define a functor from Th(DILL) to Th(ILL), we associate with any DILL-theory T the ILL-theory L(T ) obtained by adding to ILL: 
. . , z n : B n , which is also derivable in T .
Then, we extend φ DILL to a translation φ T on the types and terms of T into the types and terms of L(T ) so far described by sending any new type and any new term of T added to DILL respectively to the corresponding new type and term of L(T ) added to ILL, i.e. for example we define φ T (M ) ≡ M . By this last addition, which completes the description of L −1 (S), the translation ψ DILL : S → L −1 (S) turns out to preserve also equality judgements.
The functor L −1 can be extended on the translations T r : S → S as follows. We define
We can then prove that such functors give an equivalence of categories by employing the bijection between judgements of the form Γ | ∆ M : A and |!Γ, ∆ M : A to define the unit and counit isomorphisms.
The proof that Th( & DILL) is equivalent to Th( & ILL) is analogous.
We will provide a comparison between models of LNL and DILL (and hence ILL) when the systems have the additive conjunction & and corresponding unit 1 in the next section.
Here, we just observe that a faithful translation of ILL into LNL can be provided in a way that preserves proofs (see [5] ). In [5] a translation from LNL into ILL is also given but it does not preserve all proof equalities, as the translation of F does not turn out to be necessarily modelled by a a strong monoidal functor.
Categorical Models
The typed calculi described in the previous section have associated categorical models which we recapitulate and clarify in this section. The clarification is necessary since morphisms of models were not taken in consideration before in the literature. Thus we discuss models (and morphisms of models thereof) for RLL, ILL, LNL and DILL, as well as for these systems with additive conjunction and we compare them. Before we start with RLL, we digress a little to introduce our main tool to connect typed calculi and their semantics, namely the notion of internal language.
Notion of internal language
To relate linear typed calculi and their categorical models we use the notion of internal language. Introductions to categorical logic such as Lambek and Scott [21] and Pitts [27] , give examples of internal languages for specific categories modelling certain typed calculi.
The general idea (emphasising the role of theory-morphisms) is the following. Given a typed calculus C, we consider its category of theories as defined in the previous section. We also assume that we have sound and complete models for such a calculus with a notion of model morphisms forming a category M(C). Then we say that a typed calculus C provides an internal language for the models in M(C) if we can establish an equivalence between the category of C-theories and the category of C-models. The functors establishing the above equivalence, let us say L : M(C) → Th(C) and C : Th(C) → M(C) assign to a model M in M(C) its specific internal language L(M ) as a C-theory and to each C-theory V its syntactic category C(V) such that M iso C(L(M )) and V iso L(C(V)), that is M is isomorphic to C(L(M )) and V is isomorphic to L(C(V)). 4 Many authors, for example Barr and Wells [4] , consider only an equivalence M C(L(M )) as the characterizing property of the internal language. Lambek and Scott [21] , Pitts [27] and Crole [11] also give the definition of internal language of some class of categories and they also consider the notion of theory-morphism in terms of translation. However, contrary to Lambek and Scott and us, Pitts [27] and Crole [11] define translations between theories preserving type constructors up to isomorphisms.
Models of RLL
It is well-known that to model the modality-free fragment of intuitionistic multiplicative linear logic, or rudimentary linear logic, RLL we need a symmetric monoidal closed category [22, 18, 5] . Clearly the collection of SMC categories with the notion of morphism preserving the SMC structure, i.e. that of strong symmetric monoidal closed functors [17] , forms a category.
We recall that a (symmetric) monoidal functor (F, m F , m I F ) between the (symmetric) monoidal categories (S, ⊗, I) and (S , ⊗ , I ) is strong if m Definition 20. We call SMC the category whose objects are symmetric monoidal closed (SMC) categories and whose morphisms are strong symmetric monoidal closed. Moreover, we call SMC st the category with the same objects, but whose morphisms are strict symmetric monoidal closed functors.
Remark 21. Throughout the paper whenever we give a definition of a category of models we also give, in parallel, a strict version of it. The strict version matches the notion of translation between theories, while the relaxed one has more of a categorical flavour.
We could state and prove the soundness and completeness of the models, but this result is included in the stronger fact that the typed calculus RLL provides an internal language for autonomous categories.
Theorem 22. The typed calculus RLL provides an internal language for SMC categories, i.e. Th(RLL) is equivalent to SMC st .
Proof. We define a functor C from Th(RLL) to SMC st by associating to any RLL-theory the well-known construction of the syntactic category having types as objects and terms as morphisms (see [23] ) both modulo the corresponding equalities. Then, to any translation the functor C associates the functor induced on the syntactic categories by associating to a type and to a term their respective translations.
Conversely, the functor L from SMC st to Th(RLL) is defined by taking an SMC category S to its internal language L(S) defined by extending RLL with:
1. new ground types A and corresponding axioms A : type for each object A of S, i.e. we name the objects of S in the calculus and we extend the interpretation of RLL-types in S by interpreting the new names in the corresponding objects;
2. new terms M and x : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n M : B naming each morphism of S having the interpretation of the context x : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n as domain and the interpretation of B as codomain;
3. new equality types axioms A = B : type, provided that the interpretation of A is equal to that of B in S;
4. new equality terms axioms x : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n M = N : B, provided that the interpretation of x : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n M : B in S is equal to that of x : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n N : B by interpreting the new term symbols in the morphisms they name.
Clearly, any strict monoidal closed functor gives rise to a translation. It is easy to check that the functors so defined establish an equivalence of categories.
Part of this result, i.e. for every autonomous category S we have S C(L(S)), was first stated in [23] , but there the description of the internal language of a symmetric monoidal closed category is not complete since it does not include all the equations semantically sound in the category itself 5 .
An internal language for autonomous categories was also presented in [19] but in the style of Gentzen's sequent calculus.
Remark 23. The reason we choose the notion of strong (strict) symmetric monoidal closed functor between SMC categories rather than that of symmetric monoidal closed functor, is to match the notion of translation when proving the internal language theorem 22.
Models of ILL
Now, we give the definition of a linear category intended to be the categorical semantics for ILL. More details on the definitions and theorems proved in this subsection can be found in [25] .
Definition 24.
A linear category is a symmetric monoidal closed category (S, ⊗, I, −•, a, λ, ρ, s), together with a symmetric monoidal comonad (!, m ! , m I ! , ε, δ) such that the monoidal structure induced on the associated Eilenberg-Moore category S ! is a finite product structure.
This definition is new and equivalent to the original definition of linear category given by Bierman et al. in [10, 7, 9] . This is a consequence of the following: Proof. By definition, S is a linear category if the symmetric monoidal structure induced on the category of coalgebras is given by finite products. Hence, each !-coalgebra (A, a) has an obvious comonoid structure given by the map into the terminal object (I, m I ! ) and the diagonal morphism into the product (A, a)⊗(A, a). Consider this commutative comonoid at every free coalgebra (!A, δ A ). This provides the component at A of the natural transformations e and d.
For the other direction, the proof (appearing in [9] ) that conditions (1) and (2) imply that the symmetric monoidal structure induced on the Eilenberg-Moore category is given by finite products goes along this outline:
-S ! has a symmetric monoidal structure induced by that of S;
-from e and d with the rest of the given assumptions, one obtains a commutative comonoid on each !-coalgebra (A, a) in S ! ; -in S ! the comonoid on the unit coalgebra is the unit comonoid (I, id I , λ -every coalgebra map is a comonoid map or, equivalently, the families of counit and comultiplications of the comonoids are natural.
These properties force S ! with the given symmetric monoidal structure to be in fact a category with finite products. Indeed, the comonoid structure on any coalgebra consists of a morphism to the terminal object (for the counit) and in the diagonal morphism of binary products (for the comultiplication).
Remark 26. From the above proof we can extract the information that the components of the natural transformations e and d are uniquely determined by the finite product structure of the Eilenberg-Moore category S ! : they are respectively the morphism to the terminal object and the diagonal at each free coalgebra (!A, δ A ). Their existence depends on the choice of the symmetric monoidal comonad ! and need not be regarded as additional structure for which there could be more than one choice.
Properties (1) and (2) We point out that another concise definition of linear category similar to ours and equivalent to the original one given by Bierman appears in [16] . In [16] the property chosen to define a linear category is the fact that the Eilenberg-Moore category for the symmetric monoidal comonad (with the symmetric monoidal structure induced by the comonad) is a category of commutative comonoids in such a way that the comonoid on the unit coalgebra is the identity comonoid and the comonoid on the tensor of two coalgebras is the tensor of the comonoids on each of them.
As explained in [7, 9, 1] linear categories provide sound and complete models for ILL. In the sequel we show that the relationship between ILL and linear categories is even stronger: ILL provides an internal language for linear categories. To be able to state this result we need to give a suitable notion of morphism of linear category and define a category Lin of linear categories. The category Lin will be a subcategory of the category of comonads and strict comonad morphisms: Definition 28 (Comonads). We denote by Cmad the category whose objects are comonads (T, ε, δ) on an arbitrary category B, and whose morphisms from (T, ε, δ) on B to (T , ε , δ ) on B are functors K : B → B satisfying KT = T K, Kε = ε K and Kδ = δ K .
This notion of comonad morphism is a particular case of the one in [29] given by a natural transformation α : KT → T K (here replaced by identity) satisfying suitable conditions on and δ to preserve the comonad structure.
The reason of our strict notion of morphism between comonads is to correspond in the special case of linear categories to the notion of ILL-translations.
Definition 29. Lin (Lin st ) is a subcategory of Cmad having as objects linear categories and morphisms from (S, !, ε, δ, m
Note that, as we may expect, the natural transformations e and d of Proposition 25 are preserved by a Lin-morphism, in the sense of the following lemma. Proof. This is a consequence of the fact that K is strong monoidal, that K! = ! K as monoidal functors and that e and d are uniquely determined by the finite product structure (see Remark 26).
This proposition also shows that our definition of morphism provides a linearly distributive functor in the sense of [16] .
Using the notion of linear morphism in definition 29 we can prove:
Theorem 31. The typed calculus ILL provides an internal language for linear categories, i.e. Th(ILL) is equivalent to Lin st .
We could provide a direct proof of Theorem 31 based on the soundness theorem proved in Bierman's thesis [9] and on the completeness theorem for DILL in [1] . However, given the number of rules in ILL, we prefer to prove Theorem 31 by using Theorem 18 saying that Th(ILL) is equivalent to Th(DILL) together with the proof that DILL provides an internal language of a category of models equivalent to Lin st , as we will see in the next subsection.
Symmetric monoidal adjunctions as models of LNL and DILL
The models that are presented in the literature for LNL and DILL are based on certain symmetric monoidal adjunctions.
When working with symmetric monoidal adjunctions we often employ the useful characterization due to Kelly [17, 5] which says that an adjunction between (symmetric) monoidal categories F G is (symmetric) monoidal if and only if the left adjoint F is strong (symmetric) monoidal.
In [2] it is proved that the following structures are sound and complete models for DILL:
Definition 32 (Barber & Plotkin) . A model of DILL is a symmetric monoidal adjunction F G, with F : C → S and G : S → C, where S is a symmetric monoidal closed category and C is a cartesian category.
In [5] it is proved that the following structures are sound models for LNL:
Definition 33 (Benton) . A model of LNL is a symmetric monoidal adjunction F G, with F : C → S and G : S → C, where S is a symmetric monoidal closed category and C is a cartesian closed category.
For these structures we now need to define suitable morphisms. The corresponding categories of symmetric monoidal adjunctions are subcategories of the category of adjunctions and transformations of adjunctions as defined in [22] :
Definition 34 (Category of Adjunctions). By Adj we denote the category whose objects are adjunctions F G : A → B between any two categories and whose morphisms from F G : A → B to F G : A → B are transformations of adjunctions, that is, pairs of functors (K, H) with K : B → B , H : A → A such that KF = F H, HG = G K and such that the natural isomorphisms defining the adjunctions are preserved. That is both squares below commute
and any of the two following equivalent conditions holds: Hη = η H or Kε = ε K where η, η are the units and ε, ε the counits of the given adjunctions.
Before giving the definitions of the corresponding categories of symmetric monoidal adjunctions, we recall that a cartesian closed functor is a functor preserving the (chosen) finite products and closure up to isomorphisms and a strict cartesian closed functor is a functor preserving such a structure on the nose.
Here is the definition of the category of symmetric monoidal adjunctions sound and complete for DILL.
Definition 35. The category Sma (respectively Sma st ) is the subcategory of Adj whose objects are symmetric monoidal adjunctions between a cartesian category and a symmetric monoidal closed category and whose morphisms between two such symmetric monoidal adjunctions F G and F G are transformations of adjoints (K, H) where K is a strong (respectively strict) symmetric monoidal closed functor and H is a (respectively strict) cartesian functor and (K, H) is monoidal, that is Km Definition 36. The category → Sma ( → Sma st ) is the subcategory of Sma (Sma st ) whose objects are symmetric monoidal adjunctions between a cartesian closed category and a symmetric monoidal closed category and whose morphisms between two such symmetric monoidal adjunctions F G and F G are Sma (Sma st ) morphisms (K, H) where K is a strong (strict) symmetric monoidal closed functor and H is a (strict) cartesian closed functor.
Then, we can prove.
Proposition 37. The symmetric monoidal adjunctions in → Sma are sound and complete with respect to the typed calculus LNL.
Proof. In [5] it is proved soundness of all the rules in LNL except for the η rules whose validity follows easily, too. To get completeness we build a symmetric monoidal adjunction between the symmetric monoidal closed category S, whose objects are the linear types and whose morphisms are | a : A L M : B, both modulo the corresponding equalities, and the cartesian closed category C, whose objects are the non-linear types and whose morphisms are x : σ C t : τ , both modulo the corresponding equalities. The left adjoint on the objects is defined by F and the right adjoint by G.
In fact we obtain the stronger result below:
Theorem 38. The typed calculus LNL provides an internal language for the symmetric monoidal adjunctions in → Sma st , i.e. Th(LNL) is equivalent to → Sma st .
Proof. We define a functor C from Th(LNL) to → Sma st by mapping any LNL-theory to the construction of the syntactic category used in Prop. 37. On morphisms, C takes any translation to the functor induced on the syntactic categories by mapping types and terms to their respective translations.
Conversely, the functor L from → Sma st to Th(LNL) is defined by mapping any symmetric monoidal adjunction F G : C → S in → Sma st to its internal language L(F G) defined by extending LNL with:
1. new linear ground types A with the corresponding axiom L A : type for each object of S, i.e. we name the objects of S in the calculus and we extend the interpretation of linear types of LNL in S by interpreting the new names in the corresponding objects;
2. new intuitionistic ground types σ and I σ : type for each object of C by naming the objects of C in the same way as we did for S; 6. new equality axioms between intuitionistic types I σ = τ : type if the interpretation of σ is equal to that of τ in C;
B by interpreting the new term symbols in the morphisms they name;
8. new equality axioms between intuitionistic terms Γ I t = s : σ if the interpretation of Γ I t : σ in C is equal to that of Γ I s : σ by interpreting the new term symbols in the morphisms they name.
Clearly, any morphism in → Sma st gives rise to a translation. It is easy to check that the functors so defined establish an equivalence of categories.
Since symmetric monoidal adjunctions in Sma st are sound and complete for DILL and given that the category of ILL-theories is equivalent to that of DILL-theories, one might expect that their classes of models, Lin (Lin st ) and Sma (Sma st ), are equivalent, too. But this is not true since the first is isomorphic to a proper subcategory of the latter.
However, in [5, 26] it is said that the two axiomatisations of categorical model for ILL, respectively in terms of linear category in def. 24 and in terms of symmetric monoidal adjunction in def. 32, or even in def. 33, are equivalent. The reason is that given any symmetric monoidal adjunction between a symmetric monoidal closed category and a cartesian closed category, one obtains a linear category on the SMC category. (Actually, Barber sharpened Benton's result by proving that one does not need to start from a symmetric monoidal adjunction between a SMC category and a cartesian closed category; a symmetric monoidal adjunction between a SMC category and a cartesian category will do.) Conversely, a linear category gives rise by definition to a symmetric monoidal adjunction of def. 32 by considering the Eilenberg-Moore adjunction associated to its comonad, or to a symmetric monoidal adjunction of def. 33 by considering an elaborated construction starting from the Kleisli adjunction associated to its comonad (see def. 43).
Hence, one is led to think that the models in terms of linear categories are equivalent to those in terms of symmetric monoidal adjunctions. Instead, when we consider not only linear categories and symmetric monoidal adjunctions in def. 32 but the whole corresponding categories Lin and Sma, we can see that Lin is equivalent to a reflective subcategory of Sma. A similar relation, but via a coreflection, can be proved between linear categories and symmetric monoidal adjunctions of def. 33 in the case they are based on a symmetric monoidal closed category with finite products to model ILL extended with additive conjunction, as we will see in section 3.5.
To show these results, we recall the following facts. If one considers the class of EilenbergMoore adjunctions one obtains a full subcategory Adj em of Adj. Similarly, one obtains a full subcategory Adj k of Adj by considering the Kleisli adjunctions. Then, thanks to the strict notion of comonad morphisms in Definition 28, a comonad functor K can be lifted both to a functor between the Eilenberg-Moore categories and to a functor between the Kleisli categories. (With Street's general notion of comonad morphism in [29] one can lift a comonad functor K to a functor between the corresponding Eilenberg-Moore categories only.) We then obtain the following results:
Theorem 39 (Cmad-Isomorphisms). We have the following isomorphisms of categories:
(i) Cmad is isomorphic to the subcategory Adj em of Adj.
(ii) Cmad is also isomorphic to the subcategory Adj k of Adj.
Proof. We define the functor I em : Cmad → Adj em by taking a comonad (T, ε, δ) on B to its Eilenberg-Moore construction F T G T : B T → B and a Cmad functor K : B → B to the morphism (K, K * ) (where K * is defined by K * (A, a) = (KA, Ka) and K * f = Kf ). Similarly we define the functor I k : Cmad → Adj k by mapping a comonad (T, ε, δ) on B to its Kleisli construction F T G T : B T → B and a Cmad functor K : B → B to the morphism (K, K * ) (where K * is defined by K * (T A, δ A ) = (KT A, Kδ A ) and K * f = Kf ). Now, observe that if S is a comonad on B and T is a comonad on B , any Adj morphism (K, H) from F S G S to F T G T has the form (K, K * ) (since the left adjoint of the EilenbergMoore construction for a comonad is the forgetful functor, the commutativity required in the definition of Adj morphism and the preservation of the bijections defining the adjunctions forces H to coincide with K * ). Similarly, any Adj morphism (K, H) from F S G S to F T G T has the form (K, K * ).
Therefore, I em and I k are the inverse functors of the restrictions to Adj em and Adj k , respectively, of the functor U : Adj → Cmad that assigns to an adjunction the comonad it defines and to an adjunction morphism its first component.
The following result relates the category Adj em and Adj k to Adj. Before stating it, we recall that a reflection (coreflection) is an adjunction R I (I R) where I is the embedding functor of a subcategory into the corresponding category.
Theorem 40 (Reflection/Coreflection). Given an adjunction F G : A → B with unit η and counit ε and the induced comonad (T = F G, , δ = F ηG):
(i) the identity on B together with the Eilenberg-Moore comparison functor A → B T is the unit of a reflection R em I of Adj in Adj em ;
(ii) the identity on B together with the Kleisli comparison functor B T → A is the counit of a coreflection I R k of Adj in Adj k .
Proof. In the Eilenberg-Moore case one shows that the comparison functor R : A → B T together with the identity on B defines a universal arrow from
(since Rc is defined to be (F c, F η c ), hence K * Rc = (KF c, KF η c ), which can be seen to coincide with Hc by using the assumption KF = F S H and the fact that (K, H) preserves the natural isomorphisms defining the adjunctions).
We can combine the last two theorems to either reflect or coreflect Adj in Cmad. As an application of these theorems we get Theorem 41. The category Lin (Lin st ) is isomorphic to the full subcategory Sma em (Sma em st ) of Sma (Sma st ) with symmetric monoidal Eilenberg-Moore adjunctions in Sma, and the category Sma em is a full reflective subcategory of Sma.
Proof. The proof is based on Theorems 39 and 40 and on the fact that the Eilenberg-Moore adjunction related to the comonad of a linear category is symmetric monoidal and lives in Sma, that linear morphisms satisfy lemma 30 and that the Eilenberg-Moore comparison functor preserves products, which follows from the fact that the left adjoint F of a symmetric monoidal adjunction F G in Sma is strong monoidal.
As a consequence we get that also Lin st and Sma st are not equivalent, the first being isomorphic to a proper subcategory of the second. We deduce that the typed calculus DILL does not provide an internal language for symmetric monoidal adjunctions in Sma st . Indeed, if DILL provided an internal language for symmetric monoidal adjunctions in Sma st , then we would get that their corresponding categories of models Sma st and Lin st are equivalent, too, by Theorem 31, since Th(DILL) is equivalent to Th(ILL) by Theorem 18.
The reason why DILL does not provide an internal language for symmetric monoidal adjunctions in Sma st is that the cartesian category of a symmetric monoidal adjunction in Sma st may have objects and morphisms which are not in the domain of the functor F and no DILL-theory can provide the syntax corresponding to those objects and morphisms.
However, an internal language for such symmetric monoidal adjunctions is provided by a fragment of LNL without the intuitionistic implication in the intuitionistic part, namely LNL:
Theorem 42. The typed calculus LNL provides an internal language for symmetric monoidal adjunctions in Sma st , i.e. Th( LNL) is equivalent to Sma st . 
Adding categorical products
Recalling that & Sma k is also a subcategory of → & Sma, we note that the coreflector of the previous proposition also preserves the intuitionistic function spaces and hence we get that: Hence, we conclude that
and since all these isomorphisms are natural in the first component we obtain what wanted, i.e.
Finally, we can easily check that the comparison functor preserves the application morphism by chasing diagrams and considering that G preserves products and that F G is symmetric monoidal.
This final theorem shows that models of & DILL can only be a subcategory of models of & LNL. Note that we cannot establish a similar comparison between models of LNL and models of DILL (ILL) via Eilenberg-Moore adjunctions, since the category of coalgebras generally lacks closure, that is the function space of two coalgebras is not necessarily a coalgebra. Finally, we summarise the relationships between the models considered in this subsection in the following picture:
correspond to type-theoretic translations. Using this notion of model morphism we organised all the models discussed into categories and related them.
Checking the internal language theorems, we noticed that ILL and LNL do provide internal languages for their models already in the literature. Instead, the DILL models proposed in [2] do not have DILL-theories as their internal language but theories of a fragment of LNL.
Moreover, the study of the precise relationships between these models led us to a new concise definition of a linear category [25] . This facilitated our comparison via a reflection between the two kinds of sound and complete models of ILL given by linear categories and by specific symmetric monoidal adjunctions first shown sound and complete for DILL (and hence for ILL, as ILL is essentially equivalent to DILL) in [2, 1] . Then, we finished by proving that the models of DILL with additive conjunction expressed in terms of Kleisli symmetric monoidal adjunctions are coreflective in those of LNL with additive conjunction.
In conclusion, we have clarified the situation as far as the 'equivalence' between models of intuitionistic linear logic is considered, at least to allow us to generalise to second-order models. This paper has not investigated the relationship between models based on symmetric monoidal closed categories and (higher-dimension) models based on fibrations/indexed categories [24] . Also models for higher-order linear logics, as well as the relationship to models of other variants of linear logic (such as full intuitionistic linear logic, light linear logic, etc) are left to future work.
We have not considered Lafont's style of modelling ILL, advocated in [26] , since it is not clear to us what kind of typed calculus could provide an internal language for these kinds of categories.
Finally, from a more categorical (less logical) perspective, it would be interesting to investigate the setting in which our generic Theorems 39 and 40 are valid if, instead of considering adjunctions and comonad morphisms that satisfy equalities, we consider them up to coherent isomorphisms.
